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REDUCING THE INHERENT
MALLEABILITY OF MID-LEVEL
SCRUTINY IN COMMERCIAL SPEECH:
A PROPOSED CHANGE TO THE SECOND,
THIRD, AND FOURTH PRONGS OF THE
CENTRAL HUDSON TEST
Kayla R. Burns*
In 1980, in Central Hudson Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission of New York, the Supreme Court established the current
framework for determining the constitutionality of commercial speech
restrictions. It has been six years since the Third Circuit made its
decision in The Pitt News v. Pappert, holding, under the Central
Hudson test, that a state ban on alcohol advertisements in a college
newspaper violated the First Amendment right to free speech. Recently,
the Fourth Circuit, in Educational Media Co. at Virginia Tech v.
Swecker, applied the same test and came to an entirely different
conclusion when it held that a similar state ban was constitutional,
having met the four prongs of the Central Hudson test. These two cases,
and the resulting circuit split, highlight the extreme unrest and
uncertainty that permeates the lower courts’ decisions on the
constitutionality of restrictions on commercial speech. The Central
Hudson test is a malleable standard that has resulted in inconsistent
outcomes. What level of scrutiny should apply to restrictions on
commercial speech? How much paternalism is acceptable? This Note
proposes a change to the second, third, and fourth prongs of the Central
Hudson test, which will increase to a level of intermediate scrutiny the
evidentiary standard that courts apply, reduce paternalism in
commercial speech, and place an emphasis on the protection of
consumers. In order to prevent a chilling effect on commercial speech,
the Supreme Court must acknowledge the deficiencies of the Central
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British Columbia, Vancouver. I would like to thank the editors and staff of the Loyola of Los
Angeles Law Review for their invaluable efforts toward publishing this Note. A special thanks to
Professor Allan Ides for his guidance and insight. Most importantly, thank you to my family for
their endless love and support.
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Hudson test and replace that flawed standard with a workable
commercial speech test.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1980, in Central Hudson Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission of New York, the Supreme Court established the current
framework for determining the constitutionality of commercial
speech restrictions.1 This landmark case considered a challenge to a
New York statute that prohibited advertising by public utility
companies.2 The test consists of four prongs. First, the court must
determine whether the First Amendment protects the speech at issue.
Second, the court must find that the government interest behind the
restricting provision is substantial. Third, the court must determine
whether the regulation directly advances a substantial governmental
interest. Finally, the court must determine whether the regulation is
“not more extensive than . . . necessary to serve the [asserted]
interest.”3
Two key issues arise out of the uncertainty regarding the proper
scope and application of the third and fourth prongs of the Central
Hudson test: (1) the appropriate level of scrutiny is unclear and
permits the courts to treat government law with a deference that
undermines the First Amendment right to free speech, and (2) the
third and fourth prongs raise concerns of paternalism.4
However, these problems begin well before a court analyzes the
third prong. The Central Hudson test has been used improperly as a
commercial speech test; instead, courts should apply the test
uniquely in their analysis of overbreadth issues.5 This Note proposes
modifications that will alter the second, third, and fourth prongs of
the current Central Hudson test.

1. 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
2. Id. at 558.
3. Id. at 566.
4. See Shannon M. Hinegardner, Note, Abrogating the Supreme Court’s De Facto Rational
Basis Standard for Commercial Speech: A Survey and Proposed Revision of the Third Central
Hudson Prong, 43 NEW ENG. L. REV. 523, 528–31 (2009).
5. Melissa S. Skilken, Casenote, This Ban’s for You: 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,
65 U. CIN. L. REV. 1387, 1416 (1997); see also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S.
484, 502–08 (1996) (holding that when a challenged regulation is a blanket ban on commercial
speech, the Court should apply an overbreadth analysis).
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The First Amendment right to free speech has long been one of
the most contentious and rigorously protected constitutional rights.6
It has been six years since the Third Circuit made its decision in The
Pitt News v. Pappert,7 holding, under the Central Hudson test, that a
state ban on alcohol advertisements in a college newspaper violated
the First Amendment right to free speech.8
But, the Central Hudson test is a malleable standard that has
resulted in inconsistent outcomes. Recently, the Fourth Circuit, in
Educational Media Co. at Virginia Tech v. Swecker,9 applied the
same test and came to an entirely different conclusion when it held
that a similar state ban was constitutional, having met the four prongs
of the Central Hudson test. These two cases, and the resulting circuit
split, highlight the extreme unrest and uncertainty that permeates
lower courts’ decisions on the constitutionality of restrictions on
commercial speech. The confusion surrounds the correct application
of the third and fourth prongs of the Central Hudson test.
In response to the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Educational
Media, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) petitioned the
Supreme Court for certiorari.10 Regrettably, the Supreme Court

6. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937) (discussing the importance of free
speech). Justice Cardozo described freedom of speech as “[t]he matrix, the indispensable
condition, of nearly every other form of freedom.” Id.; see also Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,
485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988) (“At the heart of the First Amendment is the recognition of the
fundamental importance of the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and
concern.”); JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD A. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 986–87 (5th ed.
1995) (explaining the history and development of the freedom of speech in Western democracy);
cf. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758 (1985) (noting that
courts have “long recognized that not all speech is of equal First Amendment importance”); New
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 773 (1982) (holding that child pornography is generally not entitled
to First Amendment protection); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269, 283 (1964)
(holding that libelous statements are not absolutely protected under the First Amendment); Roth
v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (holding that obscene speech is not protected under
the First Amendment); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (holding that obscene
speech is not protected under the First Amendment).
7. 379 F.3d 96 (3d Cir. 2004).
8. Id. at 113.
9. 602 F.3d 583 (4th Cir. 2010).
10. Lindsey A. Zahn, Virginia Ban on Alcohol Advertisements in Student Publications May
Reach SCOTUS, ON RESERVE A WINE LAW BLOG (Aug. 24, 2010) http://www.
winelawonreserve.com/?ps=virginia+ban+on+alcohol (arguing that the link between a decreased
demand for alcohol by college students and a restriction on alcohol advertisements in student
publications does not exist; instead the ban violates the constitutional right to free speech, which
the Third Circuit’s 2004 decision in Pitt News supports).
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denied certiorari11 and consequently eliminated a unique opportunity
that would settle the courts’ difficulties in applying the Central
Hudson test in order to determine the constitutionality of commercial
speech restrictions.12
The next part will discuss the key cases leading up to the
opinion in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island13 that provides the
foundation for this Note’s proposed commercial speech test. Should
the issue of the proper application of the Central Hudson test reach
the Supreme Court, the Court should follow the application of the
Central Hudson test in Pitt News (intermediate scrutiny) and apply
the proposed “consumer protection” inquiry14 and, if applicable, the
“material evidence” test.15
II. BACKGROUND AND
STATEMENT OF EXISTING LAW
A. The Build-up to 44 Liquormart
A state may not completely suppress the dissemination of
truthful information about lawful activity out of fear for the effect
that such information will have on consumers.16 This was the
Supreme Court’s essential holding in Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council.17 At issue there
was a Virginia statute prohibiting licensed pharmacists from

11. Educ. Media Co. at Va. Tech, Inc. v. Swecker, 602 F.3d 583 (4th Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 646 (2010).
12. See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 184 (1999)
(discussing the malleability of the Central Hudson standard and the argument for its repudiation).
13. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
14. Id. The plurality opinion alludes to a new inquiry in commercial speech restrictions that
would change the second prong of the Central Hudson test. Id.
15. See Hinegardner, supra note 4, at 554–55 (proposing a new standard, the “material
evidence” test, for the third prong of the Central Hudson test).
16. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 773
(1976); see also Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 497–98 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (stating that state action to restrict the flow of accurate information to the public
because of a “perceived danger” goes against the essential freedom of speech purpose of the First
Amendment); Skilken, supra note 5, at 1394–95 (describing the Court’s reasoning in Va.
Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748, that the unrestricted flow of information was in the best interests of the
public, and rejecting the state’s paternalistic prohibition of prescription-drug advertising).
17. Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 773.

1586

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1579

advertising any price for prescription drugs.18 Virginia residents
challenged the measure as a violation of their First Amendment right
to receive information that the pharmacists endeavored to
communicate through advertisements.19 The Court confirmed
consumers’ right to receive advertised information where there was a
willing speaker and a right to advertise.20
However, the Court rejected Virginia’s arguments in favor of the
statute as being contrary to the First Amendment.21 The Court
recommended a non-paternalistic approach: “[P]eople will perceive
their own best interests if only they are well enough informed,
and . . . the best means to that end is to open the channels of
communication rather than to close them.”22
The Court saw the issue in Virginia Pharmacy as one of
information dissemination.23 The Court ultimately struck down the
Virginia statute because it restricted truthful information; that
restriction was inconsistent with the First Amendment.24
Following Virginia Pharmacy, the Court made a second attempt
at defining the parameters of commercial-speech protection under the
First Amendment.25 As previously described, the Court developed the
four-part Central Hudson test, which remains the current standard for
determining the validity of commercial speech regulations.26 In
addition, Justice Blackmun articulated in his Central Hudson

18. Id. at 749–50.
19. Id. at 753–54.
20. Skilken, supra note 5, at 1392–93 (summarizing the Court’s holding in Va. Pharmacy,
425 U.S. at 756–57).
21. Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770. Virginia tried to justify the prohibition, maintaining that
the quality of the pharmacists’ work and their patients’ health would be compromised by pricecompetition distractions that would exist if it were to allow the price advertisements. See id. at
767–68.
22. Id. at 770. The Court criticized the paternalistic notion that patients would benefit from
being “kept in ignorance.” Id. at 769.
23. Id. at 773 (explaining that the issue is “whether a State may completely suppress the
dissemination of concededly truthful information”).
24. Id. In accordance with this, Justice Stewart’s concurrence emphasized the intuitive
conclusion that, in contrast to truthful information, false and misleading advertisements may be
subject to government regulation. Id. at 776–77 (Stewart, J., concurring).
25. Skilken, supra note 5, at 1396–98.
26. See id. (describing the development and use of the Central Hudson test).
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concurrence that paternalism is never a valid justification for
restrictions on commercial speech.27
The First Amendment allots less protection to commercial
speech because of the potential danger that false and misleading
information will reach consumers.28 This highlights the essential
weakness in the Central Hudson test: the constitutionality of
commercial-speech restrictions should not be determined based on
whether the government interest is substantial, but “should depend
upon the extent to which [the] regulations protect consumers and
prevent misleading information.”29
B. 44 Liquormart: A New Inquiry
Relying on Virginia Pharmacy and Central Hudson, the
Supreme Court in 44 Liquormart implied a new inquiry for
commercial-speech restrictions. The Court considered two Rhode
Island statutes that broadly prohibited the advertising of alcohol
prices.30 The plurality opinion first recognized the immense value of
truthful, nonmisleading information in consumer decision-making.31
The plurality further noted the Court’s growing tendency to
invalidate broad bans on truthful, nonmisleading information and
commercial speech unrelated to consumer protection.32

27. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 575
(1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (stating that under the First Amendment, it is never permissible
for the government to limit expression for the purpose of influencing consumer choices); see also
Skilken, supra note 5, at 1399 (noting that Justice Blackmun argued against paternalistic
government interests, which could never justify a restriction on commercial speech).
28. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 493 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[T]hat
is, the importance of avoiding deception and protecting the consumer from inaccurate or
incomplete information in a realm in which the accuracy of speech is generally ascertainable by
the speaker.”). In his concurrence, Justice Stevens described the rationale for treating commercial
speech differently under the First Amendment. Id. at 491. In particular, consumers are more likely
to react to commercial speech before they have time to reflect on its message. Id. at 496.
Furthermore, commercial speech presents a greater risk of misleading consumers because of its
persuasive character. Id.
29. Skilken, supra note 5, at 1404–05 (describing Justice Stevens’s opinion on the purpose
of the commercial speech doctrine in Coors Brewing, 514 U.S. at 496).
30. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 489 (1996).
31. Id. at 497 (“It is a matter of public interest that [consumer] decisions, in the aggregate, be
intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial information is
indispensable.”).
32. Id. at 497–98 & n.8 (1996) (citing Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 355 (1977);
Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 700 (1977); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Willingboro,
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First, the plurality classified the price-advertising ban as a
“blanket prohibition against truthful, nonmisleading speech about a
lawful product.”33 Next the plurality expanded the second prong of
the Central Hudson test with a new inquiry.34 In addition to
determining whether the government interest was substantial, the
plurality assessed whether the ban served an end related to consumer
protection.35 Under this revised prong, the plurality found that the
ban in question did not.36 Consequently, the plurality accorded
“special care”37 in reviewing the price-advertising ban,38 subjecting
the ban to the increased scrutiny of the Central Hudson test. This
new analysis moves the focus of the traditional commercial-speech
test to be more in line with the anti-paternalistic foundation of the
First Amendment.
The plurality then continued with a traditional Central Hudson
analysis of the third and fourth prongs.39 Ultimately, the Court
invalidated the ban for lack of evidentiary support.40
The next section will discuss the history and difficulties in
applying the third and fourth prongs of the Central Hudson test.
431 U.S. 85, 92–94 (1977); and Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumers Council,
425 U.S. 748 (1976)).
33. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 504.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 502–03 (explaining that, counterintuitive to the government’s stated substantial
interest, “bans that target truthful, nonmisleading commercial messages rarely protect consumers”
from the harms that the government claims it seeks to protect against); see also Skilken, supra
note 5, at 1408 (describing the increased qualitative evaluation of the governmental interest that
the 44 Liquormart plurality introduced in its analysis of the second prong of the Central Hudson
test).
36. Id. at 504 (“There is . . . no question that the ban serves an end unrelated to consumer
protection.”).
37. Id. (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 566 n.9 (1980)).
38. Id. Justice Stevens cautioned that such regulations rarely survive constitutional scrutiny.
Id. (citing Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 n.9).
39. Id. at 505–08. This will be discussed in more detail in Part II.D, infra, of this Note.
40. Id. at 508 (“[T]he price advertising ban cannot survive the more stringent constitutional
review that Central Hudson itself concluded was appropriate for the complete suppression of
truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech.”). The plurality further concluded that there were
other, less intrusive means for Rhode Island to meet its goal of reducing alcohol consumption. Id.
at 507 (suggesting that the government could maintain higher prices either by direct regulation or
by increased taxation, that the government could limit per capita purchases in a similar manner as
prescription drugs, or that “educational campaigns focused on the problems of excessive, or even
moderate, drinking might prove to be more effective”).
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C. The Third Prong Standard of Review
Since the Court first established the Central Hudson test, chaos
has swirled around the proper standard of review for the “direct
advancement prong.”41 Lower courts have ranged widely in their
applications of the third prong: some argue for the use of a common
sense review, while others demand the use of strict scrutiny.42
Although the standard of review varies in practice, the Court has
clearly expressed that Central Hudson protection requires
intermediate scrutiny,43 not rational basis review.44
1. Common Sense and the Third Prong Unite
Legal scholars have critiqued the common sense standard of
review for its complete failure to provide any basis for the judicial
review of legislative decisions.45 The “common sense” standard is
closely related to rational basis review. Rational basis—and common
sense as courts apply it under the Central Hudson test—looks to
whether the law reasonably relates to some legitimate government
purpose. Moreover, this level of scrutiny is highly deferential to the
legislature—any conceivable purpose will suffice.46
41. Hinegardner, supra note 4, at 527 (referring to the third prong of the Central Hudson
test).
42. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 635 (1995) (finding that a 106-page
summary of a statistical support was sufficient evidence that the state regulation directly and
materially advanced the state interest under a common sense review); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of
San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 560 (1981) (applying common sense to uphold the government’s
articulation of harm under the third prong of the Central Hudson test). But see, e.g., Lorillard
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 575 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring in part) (calling for the
application of strict scrutiny in the Court’s application of the third Central Hudson prong for
purposes of combating paternalism).
43. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 719 (3d ed. 2009) (“Under
intermediate scrutiny, a law is upheld if it is substantially related to an important government
purpose.”); see, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 266 (1983); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
197 (1976).
44. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
573 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“Under this four-part test a restraint on commercial
‘communication [that] is neither misleading nor related to unlawful activity’ is subject to an
intermediate level of scrutiny . . . .”); see also Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 768 (1993)
(stating that judicial deference to the legislature is limited to rational-basis review).
45. Hinegardner, supra note 4, at 529.
46. Randolph Kline, et al., Note, Beyond Advertising Controls: Influencing Junk-Food
Marketing and Consumption with Policy Innovations Developed in Tobacco Control, 39 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 603, 608 (2006); see also FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314 (1993)
(requiring only “any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for
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Metromedia v. City of San Diego47 was the first decision to apply
common sense review under the Central Hudson test to determine
whether the challenged regulation directly advances the
government’s substantial purpose in a commercial speech context.48
The Court upheld the contended city restriction on outdoor billboards
based on “meager”49 evidence of the harm that commercial billboards
caused by distracting drivers.
The Court found “little controversy” regarding the application of
the first, second, and fourth prongs of the Central Hudson test.50
Subsequently, the Court focused its analysis on the third prong to
determine whether the ordinance “directly advanc[ed]” governmental
interests in traffic safety and in the appearance of the city.51
Addressing the first governmental interest, the Court noted that
“[b]illboards are intended to, and undoubtedly do, divert the driver’s
attention from the roadway,” and “hesitate[d] to disagree with the
accumulated, commonsense judgments of local lawmakers and of the
many reviewing courts that billboards are real and substantial
hazards to traffic safety.”52 The Court also recognized that billboards
“by their very nature”53 could be viewed as an “esthetic harm”54 and
found that there was no evidence that the city had an “ulterior
motive” for the restriction on speech.55 Ultimately, finding nothing
“unreasonable” in the previous judgments,56 the Court held that the
city ordinance was constitutional under the Central Hudson test.57
the” statute); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961) (“A statutory discrimination will
not be set aside, if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.”).
47. 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 508–09.
50. Id. at 507–08. The Court held that the ordinance’s “twin goals” of promoting traffic
safety and improving the appearance of the city were substantial government interests. Id. The
Court then rejected the appellant’s claim that the ordinance was more extensive than necessary,
such that it should fail the fourth criterion of the Central Hudson test. Id. at 508. The Court based
its opinion largely on the fact that the city had refrained from prohibiting all billboards; it
permitted on-site advertising and some other specific exceptions. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 508–09.
53. Id. at 510.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 509.
57. Id. at 512.
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This decision highlights the Court’s early deference to the
legislature, finding a minimal showing of evidence to be sufficient to
satisfy the third prong.
2. More than “Mere Speculation or Conjecture”
Next, the Supreme Court tightened its view on common sense
review in Edenfield v. Fane,58 proclaiming “mere speculation or
conjecture”59 to be insufficient evidence to satisfy the government’s
“direct advancement” assertion that its state ban on direct solicitation
by certified public accountants (CPAs) to new clients prevented
fraud and overreaching.60
First, under the second prong of the Central Hudson test, the
Court acknowledged that the government’s asserted interests—
protecting consumers from fraud or overreaching by CPAs,
maintaining CPA independence, and guarding against conflicts of
interest—were substantial.61 The Court relied on case precedent and
recognized, without question, the importance of “ensuring the
accuracy of commercial information in the marketplace”62 and “in
maintaining standards of ethical conduct in the licensed
professions.”63
Next, the Court expressed that in order to satisfy the third prong,
the regulation at issue must “directly advance the state interest
involved; the regulation may not be sustained if it provides only
ineffective or remote support for the government’s purpose.”64 The
Court gave significant weight to the plaintiff’s assertion that “in
soliciting potential clients, [he] s[ought] to communicate no more
than truthful, nondeceptive information.”65 The Court also expressed
58. 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
59. Id. at 770.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 768–70.
62. Id. at 769.
63. Id. at 770.
64. Id. (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 564 (1980)). The Florida Board of Accountancy (Board) relied on the affidavit of one of its
former chairmen, Louis Dooner. Id. at 764. Dooner contended that the solicitation ban was
necessary to preserve the independence of CPAs rendering opinions on clients’ financial
statements because a CPA who solicits clients “is obviously in need of business and may be
willing to bend the rules.” Id.
65. Id. at 765.
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concerns that Florida’s law “threaten[ed] societal interests in broad
access to complete and accurate commercial information” that the
First Amendment protected.66
Overall, the Court held that the Board had failed to demonstrate
that the ban on CPA solicitation advanced its stated purposes in a
direct and material way.67 In particular, the Court noted the lack of
anecdotal evidence or studies available to support the Board’s fears.68
Here, the Court distinguished the Central Hudson standard,
stating that, “[u]nlike rational-basis review, the Central Hudson
standard does not permit us to supplant the precise interests put
forward by the State with other suppositions.”69 The Court’s remark
makes clear that not any common sense rationale will suffice;
instead, the government’s stated purpose must be the one to meet the
direct advancement threshold of the third prong.
3. The Third Prong Is “Critical”
In Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.,70 the Court emphasized the
“critical”71 role of the third prong. It recognized the prevention of
“strength wars” by brewers in alcohol content as a substantial interest
in protecting the health, safety, and welfare of the public. Namely,
66. Id. at 766.
67. Id. at 771. Over time, the Court has progressively moved toward a heightened level of
scrutiny in its application of the third prong of the Central Hudson test. Greater New Orleans
Broad. Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 149 F.3d 334 (5th Cir. 1998) (recognizing that the Central
Hudson inquiry had “become a tougher standard . . . to satisfy”). For example, the Court in
44 Liquormart relied on Edenfield’s “advance . . . ‘to a material degree’” standard and established
that the third prong required “significant” advancement of the asserted state goal. 44 Liquormart,
Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 505 (1996) (quoting Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 771) (requiring
that the state show that “the price advertising ban will significantly reduce alcohol
consumption”); see also Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 771 (“This burden is not satisfied by mere
speculation or conjecture; rather, a governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction on
commercial speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will
in fact alleviate them to a material degree.”). Chiefly, the Court called for greater scrutiny where
the state law resulted in “[w]holesale suppression of truthful, nonmisleading information.”
44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 505. Under this higher threshold, the Court found that the state’s ban
on “advertising in any manner whatsoever” the price of alcoholic beverages, did not
“significantly reduce alcohol consumption,” such that the third prong was not met. Id. at 489,
505. In essence, the Court raised the evidentiary bar.
68. Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 771. Additionally, the Court pointed to a report by the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants that directly contradicted the Board’s claims. Id.
69. Id. at 767–68.
70. 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
71. Id. at 487.
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such a ban prevented the social costs and harms of increased
alcoholism that may result from consumers selecting the product
based on its potency.72
However, the Supreme Court found that the evidence failed to
show that the ban would achieve its purpose in a “direct and
material” way.73 The Court highlighted the “irrationalit[ies]” of the
regulatory framework, and explained that they would ensure that the
labeling ban would fail to advance its purpose.74 Coors Brewing
brings to light the Court’s growing inclination to be less deferential
and apply a stricter standard of intermediate scrutiny.
4. Protecting the Right of Consumers to
Assess the Value of Truthful and Lawful Information
The Supreme Court next considered the public’s right to receive
truthful and lawful information. Greater New Orleans Broadcasting
Ass’n, Inc. v. United States75 involved a federal act that prohibited
television and radio broadcasting of gambling advertisements in
states where casino gambling was not permitted.76 Despite the
government’s substantial interests, the Court found a need for
heightened scrutiny where the governmental purpose was to suppress
truthful speech.77 The Court articulated this belief, stating that “the
challenged regulation should indicate that its proponent ‘carefully
calculated’ the costs and benefits associated with the burden on
speech imposed by its prohibition.”78

72. Id. at 484.
73. Id. at 491. The Court found the state’s common sense arguments, “anecdotal evidence,”
and “educated guesses” insufficient to support a state ban prohibiting the display of alcohol
content on beer labels. Id. at 490.
74. Id. at 489. In particular, the Court questioned the contradictory terms of the provision,
which undermined its efforts to prevent strength wars. See id. at 488. For example, although the
regulation prohibited numerical disclosures of alcohol content, it permitted descriptive terms,
such as “malt liquor,” to indicate higher alcohol content. Id. at 488–89. Similarly, stronger
beverages such as wines and spirits, unlike beers, were not subject to the labeling restrictions. Id.
at 488.
75. 527 U.S. 173 (1999).
76. Id. at 177.
77. Id. at 193–95.
78. Id. at 188 (quoting City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417
(1993)).

1594

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1579

First, the Court found the government’s interests in (1) reducing
the social costs associated with casino gambling and (2) assisting
states where casino gambling is prohibited to control the activity to
be substantial interests.79 However, the Court noted Congress’
unwillingness to adopt a single national policy that consistently
endorsed or discouraged casino gambling.80 The Court weighed the
related social costs and economic benefits related to gambling and
concluded that the federal policy of discouraging casino gambling
was “equivocal.”81
Next the Court analyzed the ban to determine whether the ban
directly and materially advanced its stated goals. The Court found
that the regulatory scheme was “so pierced by exemptions and
inconsistencies” that it could not materially advance its stated
interest in reducing the social costs of casino gambling.82 Overall, the
Court held that under this “partial” broadcast ban there was “little
chance” that the speech restriction could directly and materially
advance its goals, “while other provisions . . . directly undermined
and counteracted its effects.”83
Finally, the Court held that the benefits of combating the social
ills associated with casino gambling did not outweigh the
“intolerable amount of truthful speech about lawful conduct” that
would be sacrificed under the policy.84 Moreover, the Court
reiterated the plurality opinion in 44 Liquormart that the power to
regulate or prohibit certain activity does not necessarily include the
power to regulate or prohibit speech about that conduct.85 The
Greater New Orleans holding effectively placed a thumb on the scale
against paternalism.
79. Id. at 185–86.
80. See id. at 187 (noting the government’s attempts to minimize the social costs of
gambling, as well as Congress’ simultaneous sanction of casino gambling for Indian tribes).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 190. For example, while a broadcaster could not advertise about privately operated
casino gambling, irrespective of the location of the casino or the place of broadcast, certain tribal
casino gambling advertisements and “[g]overnment-operated, nonprofit, and ‘occasional and
ancillary’ commercial casinos” were exempt. Id.
83. Id. at 193 (quoting Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 489 (1995)). Similarly,
the Court failed to see how the ban could further the stated interest in assisting states prohibiting
gambling when the government failed to achieve the same goal on a federal level. Id. at 194.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 193 (citing 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 509–11 (1996)).
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5. The State Action Must Be
“Necessary as Opposed to Merely Convenient”
Thompson v. Western States Medical Center86 brought the third
prong of the Central Hudson test one step further away from a
rational basis standard when it held that the state action must be
“necessary as opposed to merely convenient.”87 At issue was a Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) policy that exempted compound
drugs from FDA approval standards on the condition that providers
not promote the compounded drugs to the public.88 The FDA sought,
in the interest of public health, to prevent the large-scale production
of compound drugs by limiting public access to the medication to
pharmacist distribution only.89 The purposes of the regulation were:
(1) to preserve the effectiveness and integrity of the Federal Food
Drug and Cosmetic Act’s (FDCA) new drug-approval process, and
(2) to ensure the availability of compounded drugs to meet the
unique medical needs of individuals who were unable to use
commercially available products.90
The Court, analyzing the third prong, made clear that “if the
Government could achieve its interests in a manner that does not
restrict commercial speech, or that restricts less speech, [then it] must
do so.”91 The Court then articulated multiple non-speech-related
alternatives that could achieve the FDA’s goals, and it thus found
that the regulation did not satisfy the Central Hudson test.92 In
holding that the FDA had failed to meet its burden of establishing
that the regulation alone would be sufficient for its purpose, the
Court made clear that “regulating speech must be a last—not first—
resort.”93
This Note’s in-depth analysis of the application of the Central
Hudson test and the Court’s application of the third prong
demonstrates the lack of clarity surrounding the oft-used standard.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

535 U.S. 357 (2002).
Id. at 373.
Id. at 360.
See id. at 363.
Id. at 368.
Id. at 371.
See id. at 372.
Id. at 373.
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As some have noted, the “standard of proof is a sliding scale . . .
[t]he more logical the restriction appears to the justices, the more
lenient they will be with the evidence supporting the restriction.”94
Additionally, the test applies differently to different categories of
commercial speech—some requiring a higher standard of review.95
D. Paternalism in the Fourth Prong
The courts have long held an overriding disapproval of
paternalism in the First Amendment arena.96 The fourth prong of the
Central Hudson test addresses this exact issue in its assessment of
whether the government regulation is narrowly tailored to achieve its
stated objectives.97
Despite the Court’s distaste for paternalism, the Central Hudson
test remains unchanged and fails to reflect the anti-paternalistic
leanings of the justice system.98 The Thompson Court first struck
down the idea that the government has an interest in protecting the
public from truthful information.99 Next, the concurrence in Lorillard
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly100 articulated its anti-paternalistic sentiments in
its disapproval of the Court’s content-based reasoning that the third

94. Hinegardner, supra note 4, at 545 (comparing Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618
(1995), with Thompson, 535 U.S. at 357, Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001),
and 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996)).
95. See, e.g., Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation, Bd. of Accountancy, 512 U.S.
136, 143 (1994) (suggesting that regulation of professional solicitation deserves a higher level of
scrutiny: “the State’s burden is not slight”); see also Albert P. Mauro, Jr., Comment, Commercial
Speech After Posadas and Fox: A Rational Basis Wolf in Intermediate Sheep’s Clothing, 66 TUL.
L. REV. 1931, 1951 n.134 (1992) (remarking that in comparison to traditional commercial speech
restrictions, “restrictions on lawyer advertising seem to merit a different standard”). But see, e.g.,
44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 504 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of
N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 n.9 (1980) (suggesting that the courts must proceed with “special care”
in the case of broad restrictions on commercial speech)).
96. Consequently, it should come as no surprise that the Supreme Court has time and time
again stuck down paternalist restrictions. See Hinegardner, supra note 4, at 545 n.162.
97. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 556 (2001); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
98. See Hinegardner, supra note 4, at 548 & n.183.
99. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 374 (2002) (rejecting the argument that
“the Government has an interest in preventing the dissemination of truthful commercial
information in order to prevent members of the public from making bad decisions with the
information”).
100. 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
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prong had been met.101 The regulation at issue in Lorillard sought to
limit or prevent underage children’s exposure and access to tobacco
products by prohibiting outdoor and point-of-sale advertising.102
Justice Thomas felt that the government was paternalistically
suppressing speech about tobacco “because it object[ed] to the
content of that speech,” and thus he encouraged courts to use strict
scrutiny for such content-based regulations of speech.103
Likewise, the Court remained unpersuaded by the “vice”
exception to the First Amendment that Rhode Island proposed in 44
Liquormart.104 The state contended that the Court should have upheld
the price advertising ban on alcohol because the prohibition
“target[ed] commercial speech . . . pertain[ing] to a ‘vice’ activity”:
the sale and consumption of liquor.105 Here, the Court emphasized its
concern that the legislature might abuse the ability to deem a product
that poses a danger to public health as a “vice” in order to create a
“common law of vice” to “justify [its] censorship.”106
Thus, although the Court broadly opposes paternalistic
restrictions, it has yet to modify the “archaic”107 Central Hudson test
to reflect its important anti-paternalism concerns. The result is that
courts continue to inconsistently apply the Central Hudson test.
E. A Comparison of the Third Circuit’s and the
Fourth Circuit’s Interpretations of the Central Hudson Test
There are several fundamental differences between the Third
Circuit’s application of the Central Hudson test and that of the

101. See id. at 571–72 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part); see also id. at 576 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part) (stating that “the government may not engage in content discrimination for
reasons unrelated to those characteristics of the speech that place it within the category,”
regardless of whether a lower standard of protection was applicable to this type of regulation).
102. See id. at 533 (majority opinion).
103. Id. at 574 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice
Thomas also expressed particular concern for the “malleability” of the Central Hudson test. Id.
104. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 514 (1996).
105. Id. at 513.
106. Id. (defining “vice” products to include “alcoholic beverages, lottery tickets, or playing
cards, that may be lawfully purchased on the open market”).
107. Hinegardner, supra note 4, at 548.
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Fourth Circuit. The Third Circuit has consistently required speech
restrictions to “substantially further the asserted [state] interest.”108
In contrast, the Fourth Circuit has leaned toward applying a
more lenient standard, requiring only a logical nexus between the
challenged law and the stated harm.109 For example, in AnheuserBusch, Inc. v. Schmoke110 the court held that the government need not
conclusively prove “that the steps undertaken will solve the
problem.”111 The court emphasized that “[t]he proper standard for
approval must involve an assessment of the reasonableness of the
legislature’s belief that the means it selected will advance its ends.”112
Similarly, in Penn Advertising of Baltimore, Inc. v. Mayor of
Baltimore,113 the court permitted the city to take minor steps to
address problems, although “the fit between the City’s objectives and
the means selected to achieve them [was] not . . . perfect.”114 The
state law at issue prohibited “the placement of stationary, outdoor
advertising that advertises cigarettes.”115 Relying on Anheuser-Busch,
the court concluded that “the City must be given some reasonable
latitude.”116

108. See id. at 551 (describing the Third Circuit’s Central Hudson analysis in Pitt News and
the Second Circuit’s similar line of reasoning). Pitt News, the key Third Circuit case, exemplified
this notion: while the court acknowledged that “advertising in general tends to encourage
consumption,” it remained unconvinced that the prohibition of alcoholic beverage advertisements
in student publications “had the effect of greatly reducing the quantity of alcoholic beverage ads
viewed by underage and abusive drinkers on the Pitt campus.” Pitt News v. Pappert, 379 F.3d 96,
107 (3d Cir. 2004). Other circuits have followed the Third Circuit’s lead. For example, the
Second Circuit in Bad Frog Brewery, Inc. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., struck down a ban on
offensive beer labels used with the objective to protect children. 134 F.3d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 1998).
The court rejected the measure because of its limited impact given the “wide currency of vulgar
displays throughout contemporary society, including comic books targeted directly at children.”
Id. at 99.
109. See Hinegardner, supra note 4, at 551 (supporting the conclusion that “[s]ome circuit
courts find the third prong has been met when the causation involves the legislative presumption
that advertising increases consumption”).
110. 63 F.3d 1305 (4th Cir. 1995).
111. Id. at 1314. The court reasoned that if third prong of the Central Hudson test required
complete assurance of the success of the proposed measures, “communities could never initiate
even minor steps to address their problems.” Id.
112. Id. at 1314–15.
113. 63 F.3d 1318 (4th Cir. 1995).
114. Id. at 1326.
115. Id. at 1320 (internal quotation marks omitted).
116. Id. at 1326 (quoting Anheuser-Busch, 63 F.3d at 1316).
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The division between the circuit courts’ applications of the
Central Hudson test117 is highlighted in the conflicting holdings in
Pitt News and Educational Media.
III. CRITIQUE OF THE EXISTING LAW—
A SUMMARY OF
PITT NEWS AND EDUCATIONAL MEDIA
A. Pitt News’s Application of Intermediate Scrutiny
The Third Circuit in Pitt News struck down a Pennsylvania
statute restricting alcohol advertising in college newspapers.118 The
Third Circuit held that the state had failed to satisfy the third prong
of the Central Hudson test because the regulation did not directly
advance the state interest of reducing underage drinking on campus.

117. In addition to the Third Circuit, several other circuits have applied intermediate scrutiny
and required substantive evidence under the Central Hudson test. See, e.g., Pagan v. Fruchey, 492
F.3d 766, 771–72 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Central Hudson requires more from the government than bald
assertions that a particular speech restriction serves its articulated interests . . . . [T]he government
must come forward with some quantum of evidence, beyond its own belief in the necessity for
regulation, that the harms it seeks to remedy are concrete and that its regulatory regime advances
the stated goals.”); El Dia, Inc. v. P.R. Dep’t of Consumer Affairs, 413 F.3d 110, 116 (1st Cir.
2005) (holding that a complete absence of evidence is insufficient to satisfy the third prong of the
Central Hudson test); Valley Broad. Co. v. United States, 107 F.3d 1328, 1335 (9th Cir. 1997)
(holding that where a regulation is irrational and contradicts itself, the regulation cannot directly
and materially advance its stated interest). To complicate the issue, the Eleventh Circuit has
differed within its own decisions with regard to the correct approach to the third prong of the
Central Hudson test. Compare Mason v. Fla. Bar, 208 F.3d 952, 957–58 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding
that “simple common sense” and a single affidavit did not constitute sufficient evidence to satisfy
the third prong of the Central Hudson test because “[t]his court is unwilling to sustain restrictions
on constitutionally protected speech based on a record so bare as the one relied upon by the Bar
here”), with Borgner v. Brooks, 284 F.3d 1204, 1211 (11th Cir. 2002) (finding that two phone
surveys constitute sufficient evidence to satisfy the third prong of the Central Hudson test).
In contrast, several circuits have joined the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation of the Central
Hudson standard. See, e.g., IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 58–59 (1st Cir. 2008)
(permitting the legislature “leeway to experiment with different methods of combating a social
and economic problem of growing magnitude,” and demonstrating significant deference to the
state’s legislative record); Pruett v. Harris Cnty. Bail Bond Bd., 499 F.3d 403, 411–12 (5th Cir.
2007) (holding that a regulation that restricted an inherently dangerous activity directly advanced
a substantial governmental interest even though the government did not provide any evidentiary
support). In line with the Fourth Circuit’s more deferential standard to satisfy the Central Hudson
test’s third prong, other circuits have held that the government satisfies the third prong of the test
if it provides a study or survey in favor of the restriction. See, e.g., Missouri ex rel. Nixon v. Am.
Blast Fax, Inc., 323 F.3d 649, 654 (8th Cir. 2003); Borgner v. Brooks, 284 F.3d 1204, 1211 (11th
Cir. 2002); Chambers v. Stengel, 256 F.3d 397, 404 (6th Cir. 2001); Moore v. Morales, 63 F.3d
358, 362 (5th Cir. 1995).
118. Pitt News v. Pappert, 379 F.3d 96, 101 (3d Cir. 2004).
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In particular, the court rejected the state’s assertion that advertising
increases demand, finding the assertion speculative and not a
sufficient reason for the court to uphold the regulation. Although the
court did not disagree with the general proposition that advertising
encourages consumption, it remained unconvinced that prohibiting
alcohol advertisements in college media “had the effect of greatly
reducing the quantity of alcoholic beverage ads viewed by underage
and abusive drinkers on the Pitt campus.”119
In contrast, the district court had upheld the restriction based on
its reasoning that the prohibition had not violated the paper’s free
speech—the paper “remain[ed] free to say whatever it wishe[d]
about alcoholic beverages as long as it was not paid for engaging in
the expression.”120
The Third Circuit then reversed the district court’s holding and
found the state ban unconstitutional because (1) it failed to satisfy the
third prong of the Central Hudson test, and (2) “it unjustifiably
impos[ed] a financial burden on a particular segment of the
media.”121
First, the Third Circuit found that the state ban on alcohol
advertising in student publications failed to satisfy the Central
Hudson test because, under the third prong, the ban did not directly
advance the interest of reducing underage drinking. Namely, the
court criticized the commonwealth for its reliance on “nothing more
than ‘speculation’ and ‘conjecture.’”122
Furthermore, the court found the stated purpose of the regulation
“counterintuitive” and took issue with the fact that, regardless of the
prohibited advertisements in Pitt News, “[students] w[ould] still be
exposed to a torrent of beer ads on television and the radio, and they
w[ould] still see alcoholic beverages ads in other publications”
available on campus.123 Overall, the court found that the

119. Id. at 107 (opinion by Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito, then a Third Circuit judge).
120. Id. at 96.
121. Id. at 108–09 (referring to the segment of the media associated with universities and
colleges).
122. Id. at 108.
123. Id. at 107.
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commonwealth had failed to provide any evidence to support its
claims.124
Second, the court held that, under the fourth prong of the
Central Hudson test, the state legislature failed to sufficiently tailor
the regulation to achieve its stated objective.125 In particular, the court
found the restriction to be “both severely over- and underinclusive.”126 The court relied on Lorillard, which held that a
restriction on tobacco advertising was not narrowly tailored because
it prevented the dissemination to adults of “truthful information
about products that adults could lawfully purchase and use.”127 Here,
the court found similar paternalism in the facts of Pitt News, where
the majority of the university population was over the legal drinking
age,128 such that the regulation denied those individuals access to
legal and truthful information. The court suggested that there are
alternatives that do not affect First Amendment rights and more
directly achieve the commonwealth’s purpose of preventing
underage and abusive drinking.129
The Third Circuit also distinguished Pitt News from AnheuserBusch, a case in which the court struck down a ban on outdoor
tobacco advertising. The Third Circuit found that, while AnheuserBusch applied to an “entire medium of communication (outdoor
advertising),” the restriction in Pitt News was overly narrow in that it
only applied to a limited sector of the media (college publications)
and was thus less likely to achieve its objective of reducing underage
drinking.130 The court further pointed out that, unlike AnheuserBusch, where enforcement was an impractical alternative measure
due to the large citywide area at issue, enforcement was a valid and
124. Id. (“The suggestion that the elimination of alcoholic beverage ads from The Pitt News
and other publications connected with the University will slacken the demand for alcohol by Pitt
students is counterintuitive and unsupported by any evidence that the Commonwealth has called
to our attention. Nor has the Commonwealth pointed to any evidence that the elimination . . . will
make it harder for would-be purchasers to locate places near campus where alcoholic beverages
may be purchased.”).
125. Id. at 108.
126. Id.
127. Id. (referencing Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 564 (2001)).
128. Id. (“[M]ore than 67% of Pitt students and more than 75% of the total University
population is over the legal drinking age.”).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 108–09.
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more direct alternative available to the commonwealth in Pitt News
given the manageable and limited size of college campuses.131
Finally, the Third Circuit found the regulation to be
unconstitutional on the independent basis that it “unjustifiably
impose[d] a financial burden on a particular segment of the media,
i.e., media associated with universities and colleges.”132 The court
then held that “laws that impose financial burdens on a broad class of
entities, including media, do not violate the First Amendment”;133
however, “[a] law is presumptively invalid if it ‘single[s] out the
press’ or ‘a small group of speakers.’”134
Overall, the court applied intermediate scrutiny in its Central
Hudson analysis. Unlike cases in the long history of deference that
the courts have exercised Pitt News demonstrated a heightened
suspicion of restrictions on commercial speech. Moreover, the court
remained wary of paternalistic measures that might in effect limit the
dissemination of truthful and lawful information.
B. Educational Media’s Rationalization
Similar to Pitt News, Educational Media concerned a regulation
that restricted alcohol advertising in college newspapers. The
Virginia Alcoholic Beverage Control Board’s (“Board”) restriction
prohibited the publication of brand names or prices of alcoholic
beverages in student publications but permitted limited wording such
as “beer” and “cocktails.”135
However, in contrast to how the Third Circuit ruled in Pitt
News, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the ban was not facially
unconstitutional and met both the third and fourth prongs of the
Central Hudson test. Particularly, the court found that the
commonwealth’s evidence of a link between college students’
decreased demand for alcohol and the challenged law was

131. Id. at 108. “[I]ncreased enforcement could target very limited, easily identifiable areas—
namely, university and college campuses and surrounding neighborhoods.” Id. (noting that the
Commonwealth had failed to engage in aggressive enforcement of alcoholic beverage control
laws on college campuses).
132. Id. at 109.
133. Id. at 110.
134. Id. at 111 (citing Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991)).
135. Educ. Media Co. at Va. Tech, Inc. v. Swecker, 602 F.3d 583, 586–87 (4th Cir. 2010).
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convincing.136 The court applied a common sense rationale, finding
that because vendors want to advertise in college papers, those
advertisements must be effective, and a prohibition on such
advertisements would logically reduce college students’ underage
drinking.137
Under a “history, consensus, and simple common sense”
approach, the Fourth Circuit found that the Board’s regulation
directly advanced its goals of reducing underage drinking.138 The
court felt that the link was “amply supported by the record” and was
“strengthened because ‘college student publications’ primarily target
college students and play an inimitable role on campus.”139
Moreover, the court noted that the college newspapers had failed to
provide evidence “specifically contradict[ing]” the existence of the
link.140 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit found that the state regulation
had satisfied the third prong.
Next, in its analysis of the fourth prong and whether the speech
restriction was sufficiently “narrowly drawn,”141 the court
emphasized that the “restrictions do not need to be the least
restrictive means possible,” but must have a “reasonable fit with the
government’s interest.”142 Here the court found that the Board
narrowly tailored the statute to achieve its purpose of reducing
underage and dangerous drinking among college students.143
Unlike the Third Circuit in Pitt News, the Fourth Circuit thought
it significant that the ban at issue was not a complete ban but allowed
for certain exceptions. For example, the Board’s regulation permitted
“restaurants to inform readers about the presence and type of alcohol
they serve.”144 In addition, the ban applied only to “college student
publications,” which the court clarified did not include “all possible
136. Id. at 590.
137. See id.
138. Id. at 589 (noting that the relationship or link between the State’s interests and the
advertising ban “need not be proven by empirical evidence”).
139. Id. at 590.
140. Id.
141. Id. (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 565 (1980)).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 591.

1604

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1579

student publications on campus,” but only those “targeted at students
under twenty-one.”145 Based on this reasoning, the court concluded
that the law was sufficiently narrow to satisfy the fourth prong.146
Furthermore, in contrast to the facts in Pitt News, where the
court found that the state had not undertaken sufficient alternative
action to reduce underage drinking,147 the Board had implemented
education and enforcement programs to additionally combat
underage drinking on college campuses.148 The Fourth Circuit held
the Board’s complimenting methods of prevention to be significant
evidence in its finding that the regulation was not overly broad and
was a “reasonable fit to serve its interests.”149
Judge Moon’s dissent, however, found the government’s
evidence to be overly speculative and insufficient to satisfy the third
prong.150 The dissent pointed to the fact that the law had existed since
Prohibition, yet statistical evidence showed that underage drinking
had steadily increased since the law’s implementation.151 Citing the
Third Circuit in Pitt News, Judge Moon also discussed factors such
as the modern multimedia environment and the fact that other
publications available at the school would still expose students to
alcohol advertisements.152
Additionally, Judge Moon found fault in the Fourth Circuit’s
logic that the Board’s restaurant exception made the law narrowly
tailored to the state’s objectives. Judge Moon suggested that the
exemption undermined the legitimacy of the law, making it
inconsistent with its stated objectives:
It is inconsistent to maintain that a regulation that permits

145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See Pitt News v. Pappert, 379 F.3d 96, 108 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that the
Commonwealth had failed to engage in aggressive enforcement of alcoholic beverage control
laws on college campuses).
148. Educ. Media, 602 F.3d at 587 (describing how the Board published educational
pamphlets and enforced its regulations by using officers in targeted efforts on campuses).
149. Id. at 591 (holding that “[t]he possible existence of more effective methods does not
undermine [the advertising statute], especially in light of its role in a comprehensive scheme to
fight underage and abusive drinking”).
150. Id. at 593–94 (Moon, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 593 n.5.
152. Id. at 594 n.6.
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advertisements for “beer night” or “mixed drink night” “in
reference to a dining establishment” forms a reasonable fit
with the goal of curbing underage or excessive drinking
merely because it forbids advertisements for keg delivery,
“mojito night,” or the “Blacksburg Wine Festival.”153
The decision in Educational Media has also been criticized for
basically shifting the burden of proof onto the plaintiff.154 The court
upheld the Board’s ban stating that the newspapers had “failed to
produce ‘specific’ evidence to overcome this ‘commonsense’
proposition.”155 In his dissent, Judge Moon emphasized that under the
Central Hudson test, it is the government, not the person bringing the
challenge, that has the burden to prove that speech regulation
materially advances the stated interest.156
Next, Judge Moon took issue with the violation of the rights of
readers and advertisers. He argued for the reader’s right to “receiv[e]
truthful, non-misleading information about a lawful product” and the
advertiser’s right to communicate such information.157 This is another
example of the judiciary articulating anti-paternalistic sentiments,
suggesting a need for modification of the Central Hudson test.
Finally, Judge Moon identified the existence of a more direct
alternative means to achieving the stated objective of reducing
underage and abusive drinking. His dissent discussed increased
taxation, as well as counteradvertising, as alterative measures “which
ha[ve] been empirically verified and quantified as a means to combat
underage and binge drinking.”158
To summarize, commentators have significantly criticized the
Fourth Circuit’s decision in Educational Media, with many siding
with the Third Circuit’s application of the Central Hudson test in Pitt
News.

153. Id.
154. Katherine A. Fallow et al., Fourth Circuit Upholds Ban on Alcohol Advertising, WASH.
LEGAL FOUND. Aug. 20, 2010, at 2, available at http://www.wlf.org/Upload/legalstudies/
legalopinionletter/082010FallowLegal_Opinion_Letter.pdf.
155. Id. at 1.
156. Educ. Media, 602 F.3d at 594 (Moon, J., dissenting).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 596 n.8.
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C. Critique of the Existing Law—
Weakness in the Central Hudson Test
Several concerns have arisen out of the varied applications of
the Central Hudson test. One source of unease has been the
inconsistency in the standard of review that courts apply in the third
prong and their resulting deference to government laws. The
Supreme Court has articulated the “critical”159 importance of the third
prong for fear that, otherwise, “a State could with ease restrict
commercial speech in the service of other objectives that could not
themselves justify a burden on commercial expression.”160 The
Court’s statement highlights the overly deferential way in which
courts have applied the Central Hudson test, providing insufficient
scrutiny in their analyses of the third prong. The Supreme Court has
pushed toward the application of intermediate scrutiny, which
“requires the government regulation to achieve ‘important’ ends
through ‘substantially related’ means.”161 Although the standard of
review that is applicable under the third prong remains unclear, the
historically predominant use of a rational basis standard is
questionable and itself deserves heightened scrutiny.162
A second major concern is that “[g]overnment authorities could
use the majority’s paternalistic approach to justify other forms of
commercial speech restrictions based on disapproval of the
underlying product and the belief that it is inappropriate for
minors.”163 Essentially, this is the classic slippery-slope argument
that Educational Media illustrated. There, the concern was that the
Board’s ban on alcohol advertisements in college newspapers denied
both adults and minors their right to receive truthful information

159. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 487 (1995).
160. Id. (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 771 (1993)).
161. Hinegardner, supra note 4, at 528 (citing KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD
GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 774 (15th ed. 2004) (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
220–21 (1976)).
162. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995) (applying a common sense
review to find that the government regulation directly and materially advanced the stated
interest); Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation, Bd. of Accountancy, 512 U.S. 136
(1994); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S.
490 (1981) (plurality opinion) (applying a common sense review to uphold the government’s
articulation of the harm caused to drivers by outdoor billboards).
163. Fallow, supra note 154, at 2.
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about lawful products and activities. Here, in sum, the overarching
fear is that this reasoning could all too easily be extended by
government authorities to uphold other restrictive laws to “reduce the
content of advertising on billboards, transit systems, or other public
venues based on a purported concern to protect minors.”164 Where
government laws limit the First Amendment right to free speech,
courts should meet paternalism with increased scrutiny.
IV. PROPOSAL—
THE “CONSUMER PROTECTION” INQUIRY
AND THE “MATERIAL EVIDENCE” TEST COMBINED165
The case law concerning the constitutionality of commercial
speech restrictions under the Central Hudson test provides little
concrete guidance to the courts for future decisions. Instead, the
courts are left to their own subjective views in determining what
level of scrutiny they should apply and how deferential they should
be toward paternalistic government measures. This Note proposes
combining the “consumer protection” inquiry166 and the “material
evidence” test167 to ameliorate these concerns.
A. The “Consumer Protection” Inquiry
The “consumer protection” inquiry168 originated in the 44
Liquormart plurality opinion and added to the second prong,
substantial-government-interest analysis, of the Central Hudson test.
The “consumer protection” inquiry asks whether the regulation is
related to consumer protection and the dissemination of truthful
commercial speech.169 If the regulation relates to consumer protection
or the communication of truthful information, then the regulation

164. Id.
165. See Hinegardner, supra note 4, at 554–55 (proposing a new standard for the third
Central Hudson prong).
166. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 500–04 (1996) (plurality
opinion); Skilken, supra note 5, at 1414–21 (describing the potential benefits of the commercial
speech analysis in 44 Liquormart).
167. See Hinegardner, supra note 4, at 554–55 (proposing a new standard for the third
Central Hudson prong).
168. This Note adapts the standard that the plurality introduced in 44 Liquormart to pair it
with the “material evidence” test, a variant of the Central Hudson test.
169. See Skilken, supra note 5, at 1418.
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will receive “less than strict review,”170 defined here as rational basis
review. Under rational basis review, the regulation need only have a
“reasonable fit” with the stated government interest.171 On the other
hand, if the regulation satisfies neither criterion, a court will analyze
it under the “material evidence” test.172
B. The “Material Evidence” Test
The “material evidence” test was first introduced to provide a
more tangible standard for the amount of evidence required for the
government to support its stated interest.173 In addition, where the
government restriction appears paternalistic, the test calls for a
heightened standard of review.174 This section will first describe the
“material evidence” test and how it functions.
The “material evidence” test consists of a procedural component
and a substantive component.175 The procedural standard is based
largely on the influential employment law case McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green.176 McDonnell Douglas established a burden shifting
process that permits the court to determine which party bears the
burden of proof in the context of discrimination cases.177
The McDonnell Douglas burden shifting test has three prongs:
(1) the complainant must establish a prima facie case of racial
discrimination;178 (2) if the plaintiff has successfully established a
prima facie case, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to
provide a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its rejection of the
employee;179 and (3) if the employer satisfies this burden, the

170. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 500.
171. Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989); see, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515
U.S. 618, 641 (1995); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (plurality
opinion).
172. See Skilken, supra note 5, at 1415 (citing 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 504).
173. See Hinegardner, supra note 4, at 555 (describing the benefits of the “material evidence”
test).
174. See id.
175. Id.
176. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
177. Id. at 802.
178. Id.
179. Id.
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complainant must then demonstrate that the employer’s explanation
is but a mere pretext for another discriminatory motive.180
1. The Procedural Component Draws
from the Burden Shifting in McDonnell Douglas
Procedurally, the “material evidence” test mimics the burden
shifting in McDonnell Douglas, with one key difference: the initial
burden is on the party seeking to uphold the restriction on
commercial speech.181 This is consistent with the requirement that
“[t]he party seeking to uphold a restriction on commercial speech
carries the burden of justifying it.”182 When a party challenges a
government restriction of speech, it is usually the government that
must justify the disputed regulation.183 This is essentially the first
prong in the “material evidence” test.
Thus, the “material evidence” test would function under three
prongs: (1) the government, as the party trying to uphold the
regulation, must justify the regulation’s existence; (2) the burden
then shifts to the complainant to prove that the regulation is
paternalistic such that the justification is a mere pretext to control
undesirable conduct that the government achieves through the
restriction of free speech;184 and (3) if the complainant succeeds, the
burden shifts back to the government to prove that its justifications
are not paternalistic and thus not pretextual.185
Overall, the “material evidence” test addresses two of the key
problems that this Note has identified with the current Central
Hudson test: (1) lack of an evidentiary standard, and (2) paternalism.
The “material evidence” test allows a party to present more evidence
than it could under the classic “common sense” standard.186 Both
parties have several opportunities, as the burden of proof shifts, to
present evidence to support their respective positions. In addition, the
180. Id. at 804.
181. See Hinegardner, supra note 4, at 556 (differentiating the “material evidence” test from
the McDonnell Douglas test).
182. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 (1993) (alteration in original) (quoting Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 71 n.20 (1983)).
183. See Hinegardner, supra note 4, at 556 n.253.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 556–57.
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second prong of the “material evidence” test permits the complainant
to question whether the restriction is paternalistic. This adds an extra
level of scrutiny to the analysis and avoids the court itself having to
challenge the regulation for possible paternalistic leanings. The test
also provides advance warning to the legislature that it must be able
to adequately support its reasoning in its restriction of free speech.187
2. The Substantive Component
Does Away with “Common Sense”
The substantive component of the “material evidence” test
abandons the “common sense” standard.188 Under the first procedural
burden, the government may not use a “common sense”
justification.189 Instead, the government’s legitimate interest must
satisfy intermediate scrutiny.
a. The government’s initial burden—
“some quantum of evidence”190
This Note’s previous discussion of case precedent demonstrates
the lack of clarity as to the amount of evidence that the government
needs to justify its restriction of commercial speech. However, under
the “material evidence” test, “the government must put forth a
significant, verifiable, and reasonable quantum191 of evidence beyond
common sense and ‘mere speculation or conjecture’ to satisfy the
third prong.”192 Although the Court has provided little guidance as to
what constitutes sufficient evidence, there must be “ample
documentation.”193 The evidence cannot be “‘bare,’ ‘irrational[],’
‘puzzling,’ lacking in ‘any evidentiary support whatsoever,’
fundamentally flawed, or based on ‘hypothesized justifications.’”194
187. See id. at 557.
188. See id.
189. Id.
190. Pagan v. Fruchey, 492 F.3d 766, 771 (6th Cir. 2007) (requiring the government to show
“some quantum of evidence, beyond its own belief in the necessity of regulation, that the harms it
seeks to remedy are concrete and that its regulatory regime advances the stated goals”).
191. Hinegardner, supra note 4, at 557 (referring to BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1276 (8th ed.
2004), which defines “quantum” as “the required, desired, or allowed amount”).
192. Id. (citing Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770–71 (1993)).
193. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 561 (2001).
194. Hinegardner, supra note 4, at 558 (quoting various Supreme Court commercial speech
cases).
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Finally, the regulations must be more than a mere convenience, and
legislatures should take care to ensure that the regulation is a “last—
not first—resort.”195
In short, “simple common sense”196 is insufficient to support a
justification for a restriction of commercial speech. A “common
sense” standard is subjective, “reasonable minds differ”197 on what is
reasonable, and a “common sense” standard does not meet any of the
requirements detailed above.
Instead, the “material evidence” test calls for intermediate
scrutiny: an examination more searching than that of the “common
sense” standard in the third prong of the Central Hudson test. Courts
must balance the interests of the state and those of the constitutional
right to free speech, “weighing the circumstances”198 and requiring
more than mere deference. There must be some quantum of
evidence.199
b. The plaintiff’s burden—
an open forum to challenge paternalism
In its analysis of the government’s justification, the court must
consider all relevant information tending to show pretext.200 A
facially neutral regulation may in fact be a content-based
regulation.201 For example, arguably the laws at issue in both Pitt
News and Educational Media were facially neutral—the laws
prohibited alcohol advertisements generally, encompassing both proalcohol and anti-alcohol advertisements. In practice however, the
measures were content-based restrictions uniquely prohibiting proalcohol advertisements. Where there is a content-based regulation,
the courts will use closer scrutiny.202 The “material evidence” test

195. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 373 (2002).
196. Hinegardner, supra note 4, at 558 (citation omitted).
197. Id.
198. See id. at 560 (quoting William E. Lee, Manipulating Legislative Facts: The Supreme
Court and the First Amendment, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1261, 1261 (1998)).
199. Pagan v. Fruchey, 492 F.3d 766, 771 (6th Cir. 2007).
200. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804–05 (1973).
201. Hinegardner, supra note 4, at 561.
202. Wilson Huhn, Scienter, Causation, and Harm in Freedom of Expression Analysis: The
Right Hand Side of the Constitutional Calculus, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 125, 127 (2004)
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thus provides for a “content distinction that is missing from the
Central Hudson analysis.”203 Articulating a need to substantiate the
third prong of the Central Hudson test, Professor Huhn, a scholar on
content-based regulations, suggests that the more a regulation
restricts freedom of expression, the more proof of harm the
government must establish to justify its actions.204
c. The government’s rebuttal—
not paternalism and therefore not a pretext
The final prong of the “material evidence” test is an effective
means of “putting legislatures on notice”205 that they must be able to
provide a “quantum”206 of evidence beyond rational basis to support
their restrictions on commercial speech. Contrary to the Fourth
Circuit’s holding in Educational Media, “[a] fear of the persuasive
influence of nondeceptive speech concerning lawful products and
services is a presumptively invalid rationale for commercial speech
regulations.”207 By providing advance warning of the threshold
evidence requirements that such a restriction must meet, the test goes
toward preventing the enactment of paternalistic measures.
Legislators may be more cautious in approving laws that they cannot
adequately justify with “ample”208 evidence.
V. JUSTIFICATION
A. Benefits of the “Consumer Protection” Inquiry
The “consumer protection” inquiry is an effective tool in helping
the judiciary decide the appropriate level of review without having to
define the speech as commercial209—relating to a commercial

(“[T]ypically content based laws have been evaluated under a stricter standard of review than
content neutral laws.”).
203. See Hinegardner, supra note 4, at 562 (citation omitted).
204. Id. at 562 (discussing Huhn, supra note 202, at 125–26).
205. Id. at 564.
206. Id. at 557.
207. Id. at 564 (quoting William E. Lee, Manipulating Legislative Facts: The Supreme Court
and the First Amendment, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1261, 1288 (1998)).
208. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 561 (2001) (“ample documentation”).
209. See Skilken, supra note 5, at 1419 (arguing that under the 44 Liquormart plurality
analysis, definitional distinctions would not be necessary).
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transaction or economic interests of the speaker210—or place the
speech under the broader category of noncommercial speech.
Instead, in deciding the type and level of review to apply, the new
inquiry asks simply: “whether the regulation promotes the
dissemination of truthful, nonmisleading information.”211
This approach will also provide much needed clarity to
legislatures in dealing with commercial speech regulations. Previous
commercial speech regulations involved subjective judgments about
how substantial the government interest was and how closely the
regulation fit those interests.212 The 44 Liquormart plurality
explained that governments may regulate commercial speech, but
only in the interest of protecting consumers and the dissemination of
truthful information.213 Consequently, legislatures will have to
provide “full disclosure of objectively verifiable information”;
however, the standard allows regulations of false and misleading
advertisements.214 Under this new standard, a regulation that (1)
“protect[s] consumers from misleading commercial messages,”215(2)
“promote[s] dissemination of truthful information,”216 or (3)
“ensure[s] the fair bargaining process”217 will be constitutional under
the First Amendment.
Finally, the “consumer protection” inquiry encourages
legislatures to avoid paternalism in creating commercial speech
regulations. Previous decisions under the Central Hudson test have
permitted paternalistic justifications for restrictions on commercial
speech. For example, in Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v.
Tourism Co.,218 at issue was a commercial speech restriction that

210. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561–62
(1980).
211. See Skilken, supra note 5, at 1419 (summarizing the new commercial speech inquiry
proposed in 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. 484, 500–02 (1996)).
212. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 485–86 (1995); Posadas de P.R. Assocs.
v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 341 (1986); Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 568–69; Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 766–68 (1976).
213. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 500–04.
214. Skilken, supra note 5, at 1420 (interpreting the 44 Liquormart Court’s analysis).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
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prohibited casino advertisements directed toward local citizens but
permitted advertisements directed at tourists.219 Puerto Rico had the
right to regulate gambling, and in upholding the restriction, the Court
justified that “the power to regulate a particular activity directly
included the lesser power to regulate speech about that activity.”220
However, the 44 Liquormart plurality expressly contradicted this
rationale, holding that the government’s authority to regulate a
product or activity will never justify restricting speech in that
domain.221 The holding in 44 Liquormart clarifies that a commercial
speech regulation will not pass constitutional muster where the
defense is based on paternalism.222
In short, the “consumer protection” inquiry clarifies the standard
of review that courts should apply when they evaluate commercial
speech restrictions, provides much needed guidance to legislatures,
and discourages paternalism. The inquiry balances the government’s
power to regulate commercial speech and society’s interest in “the
fullest possible dissemination of information.”223
B. Benefits of the “Material Evidence” Test
The proposed “material evidence” test improves on the current
Central Hudson test in three ways. First, it rejects the “common
sense” standard and upholds intermediate scrutiny in courts’ analyses
of the evidence that governments offer to support a justification for a
challenged restriction of commercial speech. Although the judiciary
has not defined the precise amount of evidence necessary,
intermediate scrutiny requires more evidence than the “common
sense” standard requires. A more exacting analysis will appropriately
place a heavier burden of proof on any party wishing to suppress the
constitutional right to free speech. The test also permits each party
additional opportunities to present evidence to support its respective
219. Id. at 331–32.
220. Skilken, supra note 5, at 1401 (citing Posadas, 478 U.S. at 344–47).
221. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 510–13 (1996) (plurality opinion).
222. See Skilken, supra note 5, at 1420 (citing 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 509–14).
223. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561–62
(1980); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 12–15, at 903 (2d
ed. 1988) (“The entire commercial speech doctrine, after all, represents an accommodation
between the right to speak and hear expression about goods and services and the right of
government to regulate the sales of such goods and services.”).
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claims. Furthermore, a heightened evidentiary requirement will serve
to moderate the wide variation of justifications that courts deemed
acceptable in previous cases.
On the other hand, opponents to the notion of a heightened
inquiry under the third prong of the Central Hudson test have shared
concerns that such an action would result in a “leveling effect” that
would devalue the objectives of the First Amendment.224 Their
concern is that commercial speech225 may be protected at the expense
of “other forms of speech deserving greater ‘constitutional
moment.’”226 However, this argument lacks force. Regardless of the
level of scrutiny that courts apply to commercial speech, this in no
material way detracts from the protections that the First Amendment
accords to noncommercial speech.227 A heightened protection for
commercial speech only serves to better guard fundamental free
speech principles.228
The “material evidence” test will also provide for much needed
protection from paternally motivated restrictions by placing an added
burden on the government to justify the regulation at issue. Where
the government seeks to deny a constitutional right, a simple
“because it’s in your best interests” justification will not suffice
without a further showing of evidentiary support. When considering
First Amendment issues, it is the right and responsibility of the
public, not the state, to decide the value of the information being
communicated.229

224. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 506 (1981) (“To require a
parity of constitutional protection for commercial and noncommercial speech alike could invite
dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the force of the Amendment’s guarantee with respect to
the latter kind of speech.” (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978))).
225. Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 473 (1989) (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va.
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)) (defining commercial speech as speech
that “propose[s] a commercial transaction”).
226. Hinegardner, supra note 4, at 563 (quoting Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563 n.5).
227. See id. (supporting the idea that increasing the amount of inquiry for commercial speech
“will not disrupt the key distinctions between commercial and noncommercial speech”).
228. See id. at 559 n.280.
229. See Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 645 (1995) (Stevens, Kennedy, Souter,
Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) (“[T]he general rule is that the speaker and the audience, not the
government, assess the value of the information presented.” (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S.
761, 767 (1993))).

1616

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1579

In sum, the “material evidence” test empowers the people to
raise concerns of paternalism and to take action to protect the right to
“truthful information about lawful products and activities”230 to
prevent a chilling effect on commercial speech.
VI. APPLICATION OF
THE “CONSUMER PROTECTION” INQUIRY AND
THE “MATERIAL EVIDENCE” TEST
TO PITT NEWS AND EDUCATIONAL MEDIA
Educational Media applied a rational basis review under the
third prong of the Central Hudson test to uphold a paternalistic
restriction on the content of college publications. Educational Media
is important not only because it provides precedent for the amount of
evidence that the Central Hudson test requires but also for its direct
contradiction of the Third Circuit’s decision in Pitt News. This part
will demonstrate the application of the “consumer protection”
inquiry and of the “material evidence” test. In doing so, it will show
what the likely outcome in Educational Media would have been if
the Supreme Court had rejected a default rational basis review and
clarified the standards that must be met under the Central Hudson
test.
A. The “Consumer Protection” Inquiry
The “consumer protection” inquiry replaces the Central Hudson
second prong, which assesses whether the government interest is
substantial. Instead, the inquiry asks “whether the regulation
promotes the dissemination of truthful, nonmisleading
information.”231 To meet this standard, the regulation may be one
that: (1) “protect[s] consumers from misleading commercial
messages,”232 (2) “promote[s] dissemination of truthful
information,”233 or (3) “ensure[s] the fair bargaining process.”234

230. Fallow, supra note 154.
231. See Skilken, supra note 5, at 1419 (summarizing the new commercial speech inquiry
proposed in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 500–02 (1996)).
232. Id. at 1420 (summarizing the 44 Liquormart Court’s analysis).
233. Id.
234. Id.
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In Educational Media the government sought to “combat[] the
serious problem of underage . . . and abusive drinking by college
students.”235 Although the state’s goal arguably went toward
protecting underage student consumers from the dangers of
alcohol,236 this noble objective would likely fail to satisfy the
“consumer protection” inquiry.
First, a complete ban (with the exception of limited restaurant
advertisements)237 prohibiting student publications from publishing
alcohol advertisements does not protect student consumers from
receiving misleading information.238 Advertisements for happy hour
specials, alcohol brands, and prices of alcohol beverages are
generally not misleading. Although advertisements by nature are
persuasive, the actual content of these messages is factual. The
Educational Media court supported this argument, reasoning that
“[the Board] ha[d] not provided evidence that the speech [was]
actually misleading, and there [was] no evidence that the advertising
restrictions were enacted to prevent the dissemination of misleading
information.”239
Second, it would be difficult to say that a complete ban on
alcohol advertisements somehow promotes truthful commercial
speech. Legislatures primarily enact complete bans to prevent the
dissemination of particular messages.240 “[R]ather than protecting the
consumer, a complete ban serves only to deprive the consumer of
potentially valuable information and inhibits discussion of public
policy choices.”241 Here, the ban denies student consumers
information that will allow them to make informed decisions in the
alcoholic beverages that they choose to consume.242 The state ban

235. Educ. Media Co. at Va. Tech, Inc. v. Swecker, 602 F.3d 583, 589 (4th Cir. 2010).
236. Id.
237. Id. at 587 (prohibiting advertisements for alcoholic beverages unless the advertisements
are in reference to a restaurant and the permitted restaurant advertisements are limited to “five
approved words and phrases”).
238. Id. at 589. The Court assumed that the speech is not misleading.
239. Id. (quoting W. Va. Ass’n of Club Owners & Fraternal Servs., Inc. v. Musgrave, 553
F.3d 292, 302 (4th Cir. 2009)).
240. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996).
241. Skilken, supra note 5, at 1407–08.
242. Educ. Media Co., 602 F.3d at 587 (restricting advertisements that refer to the brand or
price of beer, wine, or mixed beverages).
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strictly removes speech and in no way supplements or provides
truthful, valuable information to the student consumer.
Finally, the ban does not “ensure . . . fair bargaining.”243 If
anything, the prohibition deprives students of valuable information
about brand and price that is essential to a fair bargaining process.244
For example, students who are not aware of the reasonable cost of a
certain alcohol product may easily be misled and induced to pay
exorbitant prices.
Overall, a court would likely conclude that the Board’s interest
in banning alcohol advertisements in student newspapers was not
related to protecting consumers from misleading commercial speech,
and that the regulation should receive the “special care”245 that the
Central Hudson test demands.
Consequently, this Note’s analysis will turn to the “material
evidence” test, a variant of the Central Hudson test, to evaluate the
constitutionality of the Board’s ban. Yet because the statute deprives
consumers of truthful, nonmisleading information and acts as a
blanket ban, it will likely not survive First Amendment review.246
B. The “Material Evidence” Test:
The Government’s Initial Burden
Under the “material evidence” test, a court would first consider
whether the Board, in seeking to uphold a prohibition on
“advertisements [in college student publications] for beer, wine, or
mixed beverages unless the ads are ‘in reference to a dining
establishment,’”247 satisfied its initial burden to justify the restriction.
The evidence must show that the government “‘carefully calculated’
the costs and benefits associated with the burden on speech imposed

243. Skilken, supra note 5, at 1420.
244. Peter M. Gerhart, The “Competitive Advantages” Explanation for Intrabrand Restraints:
An Anti-trust Analysis, 1981 DUKE L.J. 417, 428 (1981) (explaining the importance of price and
brand in fair bargaining).
245. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 n.9
(1980).
246. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 504 (1996) (explaining that “speech
prohibitions of this type rarely survive constitutional review”).
247. Educ. Media, 602 F.3d at 587.
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by its prohibition.”248 The Board asserted that “history, consensus,
and common sense support the link between advertising bans in
college newspapers and a decrease in demand for alcohol among
college students.”249 The Board relied on “judicial decisions
recognizing this general link,” and, moreover, it felt that the link was
“extraordinarily strong” because of the heightened level of influence
that college papers have over students.250 The Board went on to argue
that, given the large amount of money that advertisers spend in
student publications, the logical conclusion was that such
advertisements must be effective and increase demand.251
Here, the Board has failed to provide even a “quantum”252 of
evidence to support its assertion that there is a link between the ban
and decreased alcohol demand by students. Instead, the Board seems
to rely on logical and rational thought, stating that it is “illogical to
think that alcohol ads do not increase demand”; if the ads were
removed, common sense dictates that demand must decrease.
However, “reasonable minds [can] differ,”253 and one might find that
eliminating such advertisements does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that demand should decrease. It may in fact remain static,
or even increase due to other factors. Nothing in the Fourth Circuit’s
discussion of Educational Media suggests that the Board carefully
“weigh[ed] the circumstances”254 to balance the costs that the ban
would impose on the papers financially, the rights of the college
population who have a “protected interest in receiving truthful, nonmisleading information,” the advertiser’s “right to communicate such
information.”255
Given the common sense arguments that the Board has made,
combined with the lack of any evidentiary support for the ban, a
248. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 188 (1999)
(quoting City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417 (1993)).
249. Educ. Media, 602 F.3d at 589.
250. Id. (noting that the link with college papers is extraordinarily strong because as “a
targeted form of media bearing the name of the college, [college papers] attract more attention
among college students than other forms of mass media”).
251. Id.
252. Hinegardner, supra note 4, at 557.
253. Id. at 558.
254. Id. at 560 n.292.
255. Educ. Media, 602 F.3d at 594 (Moon, J., dissenting).
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court under the first prong of the “material evidence” test might well
find that the government has failed to meet its burden. If the court
were to come to this conclusion, the analysis would be complete, and
the court could not uphold the prohibiting statute. However, if the
court were to find that the Board had provided “ample
documentation,”256 as the Fourth Circuit in fact did,257 then the
analysis would proceed to the second prong of the “material
evidence” test.
C. The “Material Evidence” Test:
The Complainant’s Claim of Paternalism and Pretext
The second prong of the “material evidence” test shifts the
burden of proof to the complainant to show that the government’s
measure is paternalistic and that the government’s justifications are
but a mere pretext for controlling undesirable behavior through the
restriction of free speech.258 The pretext is that, although neutral on
its face, the restriction is actually a content-based regulation of
truthful, lawful commercial speech that the government designed to
deprive the public of lawful information.259
The college papers, which suffered an approximately $30,000
per year loss in advertising revenue, rebutted the Board’s arguments
and criticized the Board’s lack of evidence that showed that the
advertising ban actually decreased demand among students.260 In
addition, the papers found the ban to be ineffective because outlets in
other forms of media were still able to advertise alcohol, and thus
alcohol ads nonetheless reached students.261 Finally, the papers
suggested that the ban’s exemption for restaurants undermined the
effectiveness of the measure.262
Here, the college papers have raised valid concerns as to the
amount of evidence that the government presented to support the

256. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 561 (2001).
257. Educ. Media, 602 F.3d at 590 (concluding that the advertising ban satisfied Central
Hudson’s third prong and finding the proffered link to “be amply supported by the record”).
258. Hinegardner, supra note 4, at 556.
259. Id. at 561.
260. Educ. Media, 602 F.3d at 590.
261. Id.
262. Id.
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restriction, as well as the restriction’s actual effectiveness based on
the exposure that students receive from other forms of media.
Although the Fourth Circuit found that the “college newspapers
fail[ed] to provide evidence to specifically contradict [the] link or to
recognize the distinction between ads in mass media and those in
targeted local media,”263 a court applying the second prong of the
“material evidence” test might alternatively find that the papers had
triggered a higher evidentiary standard by raising concerns of
perceived paternalistic restrictions. Under such a holding, the court
would then analyze the third prong of the “material evidence” test.
D. The “Material Evidence” Test:
The Government’s Rebuttal Burden
The third and final prong of the “material evidence” test permits
the government to rebut the complainant’s accusations of paternalism
and pretext. The government must show that the regulation “either
[is] not paternalistic . . . or is justifiably paternalistic.”264 To do so,
the government may not rely on common sense but must show that a
“reasonable legislator” could believe that the regulation was not for
the purpose of depriving the public of valuable information.265
First, the Board defended the prohibition stating that it had
narrowly drawn the ban to meet the objective of a “comprehensive
scheme attacking the problem of underage and dangerous drinking
by college students.”266 The Board noted that the ban was not a
complete ban on all alcohol advertisements but that the ban allowed
for advertisements “in reference to . . . dining establishment[s].”267
Moreover, the ban only applied to “college student publications” and
did not impose itself on “all possible student publications on
campus.”268
In addition, the Board did not rely solely upon the advertisement
restriction in achieving its goals; it also considered “non-speech

263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

Id.
Hinegardner, supra note 4, at 564.
Id.
Educ. Media, 602 F.3d at 590.
Id. at 587.
Id. at 591.
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related mechanisms,”269 such as educational pamphlets and
enforcement officers, to uphold its regulations.270
The Board’s “multi-pronged attack” on underage drinking
swayed the Fourth Circuit.271 In analyzing the government’s burden
to rebut the complainant’s accusations of paternalism and pretext, a
court might also find that the Board’s ban is narrow. Moreover, a
court could determine that the Board’s use of non-speech-related
mechanisms is compelling evidence that the ban is not paternalistic
and that the legislators truly believe that it is necessary to achieve the
important goals of reducing underage and abusive drinking. Such a
court would then conclude that the government had successfully
rebutted the paper’s claims of paternalism and that it should uphold
the law.
On the other hand, although the ban need not be the least
restrictive means to achieve the legislature’s purpose, the ban must
be “one whose scope is in proportion to the interest served.”272 A
court might equally find that, similar to the ban in Pitt News, the ban
is simultaneously over- and under-inclusive because the prohibition
is overbroad in its effect on campus members over the age of twentyone and is not limited to those under the legal drinking age.273 A
court might also find the measure underinclusive in that it only
applies to student papers, while it permits other similar publications
on campus targeted at the same audience to publish alcohol
advertisements.274 Following this analysis, a court might conclude
that the ban is merely a guise for the government’s true intentions of
controlling the undesirable, unruly behavior in youth at educational
establishments and that restricting speech is just a “convenient”275
way for the government to achieve its goals.
As the above application to Educational Media of the “material
evidence” test suggests, the outcome of the Fourth Circuit’s decision
269. Id.
270. Id. at 587.
271. See id. at 591.
272. Id. (quoting W. Va. Ass’n of Club Owners and Fraternal Servs., Inc. v. Musgrave, 553
F.3d 292, 305 (4th Cir. 2009)).
273. Id. at 589.
274. Id. at 591.
275. See Hinegardner, supra note 4, at 558.
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may very well have been the same under both the Central Hudson
test and the “material evidence” test. However, the “material
evidence” test did, under the burden-shifting approach, increase the
amount of evidence that each party had to provide to support its
respective assertion.
Additionally, the “material evidence” test does not simply cast
aside and leave the issue of paternalism to the subjective views of the
court. Instead, the second and third prongs of the test highlight
paternalism.
VII. CONCLUSION
Public policy indicates that courts should avoid inconsistent and
unpredictable outcomes in the context of the First Amendment. The
current Central Hudson test leaves businesses and the legal
community guessing the outcomes of future cases.276
The proposed “consumer protection” inquiry acts early on in the
Central Hudson analysis to guide courts as to whether they should
apply rational basis review or intermediate scrutiny. The
modification of the second prong shifts the focus from whether the
government interest is substantial to whether the regulation relates to
both consumer protection and the dissemination of truthful
commercial speech.277 In effect, the inquiry focuses on the practical
effects that the challenged restriction will have on consumers, rather
than on the restriction’s theoretical goals.
By combining the “consumer protection” inquiry with the
“material evidence” test, courts will apply a heightened evidentiary
standard that will significantly reduce the unpredictability of the
Central Hudson test and prevent the intermediate scrutiny standard
of review from falling to an inappropriate rational basis level.
Moreover, the heightened evidentiary standard that the combination
places on the government will provide additional protections against
the inherent malleability of mid-level scrutiny devices such as
276. The Supreme Court’s protection for commercial speech has been a “Supreme Court
made roller coaster ride.” Andrew S. Gollin, Improving the Odds of the Central Hudson
Balancing Test: Restricting Commercial Speech as a Last Resort, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 873, 909
n.224 (1998) (quoting Felix H. Kent, Re-Affirmation of First Amendment in Commercial Speech,
N.Y. L.J., Apr. 6, 1993, at 3).
277. See Skilken, supra note 4, at 1418.
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paternalism.278 This is consistent with the core of the Central Hudson
test as well as with the First Amendment’s “anti-paternalistic
premise.”279
If Congress is aware of its responsibility to create law with more
thoughtful consideration of the people’s rights and their need for
knowledge, such awareness will act as a preventative measure
against paternalistic restrictions on commercial speech. The simple
precautions that the “consumer protection” inquiry and the “material
evidence” test propose will serve to better protect citizens’
fundamental free speech interest by requiring a greater evidentiary
showing that a regulation directly and materially advances its stated
purpose and is not paternalistic.
“[T]he greatest menace to freedom is an inert people.”280 In order
to prevent a chilling effect on commercial speech, the Supreme Court
must acknowledge the deficiencies of the Central Hudson test and
replace that flawed standard with a workable commercial speech test.

278. See E-mail from Allan Ides, Professor, Loyola Law School Los Angeles, to Author
(Dec. 7, 2010, 07:09 PST) (on file with Author).
279. Skilken, supra note 5, at 1415–16.
280. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 43, at 1208 (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)) (explaining why freedom of speech is protected).

